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RIGHTS RHETORIC AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF RELIGIOUS OPPRESSION IN SRI LANKA
Tracy Hresko*
Abstract: Two laws proposed by the Sri Lankan government present a
threat to Christians and other religious minorities in the country.  Though
purportedly designed to prevent “unethical or fraudulent conversions,”
the laws are overly broad and ill-deªned, giving Sri Lankan ofªcials the
latitude to use them to suppress minority religious activities. Indeed,
despite being couched in the rhetoric of religious liberty and human
rights, the laws are likely to be used by the Buddhist majority as instru
ments of oppression over unpopular religious groups.
Introduction
“Militant Buddhism” may sound like an oxymoron, but it is a fact
of life and has been a source of violent oppression in Sri Lanka in re-
cent years.1 Indeed, since 2002, militant Buddhists on the island have
rabidly pursued the suppression of Christianity and have stirred up
popular opposition to the Christian faith.2 As a result, in the last two
years alone there have been over 150 violent attacks on Christians and
churches in the nation.3 Pastors and missionaries have been beaten
and sexually assaulted.4 Mobs armed with bicycle chains have sur-
rounded churches and burnt them to the ground.5
                                                                                                                     
* Tracy Hresko is the Senior Executive Editor for the Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review. The author would like to thank the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty for their advice and support during the writing of this note.
1 Claudia Winkler, Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka: Militant Buddhists Are Attacking Christian
Churches and Threatening the Freedom of Religion in South Asia, Weekly Standard, Dec. 2, 2005,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/004/468rruhe.asp.
2 Sarah Page, Sri Lankan Cabinet Approves Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Act for the Protection of Relig-
ious Freedom’ Makes Religious Conversion a Criminal Offense, Human Rights Without Fron-
tiers, Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.hrwf.net/html/sri_lanka_2004.html#SriLankanParliament.
3 See Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Trip Reports: Sri Lanka, http://www.
csw.org.uk/Countrytripreports.asp?Item=503 (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) [hereinafter
Christian Solidarity]; Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Lanka Liberty: A Website De-
voted to Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka, http://www.lankaliberty.com (last visited Dec. 2,
2005) [hereinafter Becket Fund].
4 Becket Fund, supra note 3.
5 Winkler, supra note 1.
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The treatment of Christians in Sri Lanka is likely to get worse
over the coming years in light of two laws recently proposed by the Sri
Lankan government.6 These laws would prohibit unethical or fraudu-
lent religious conversions and harshly punish anyone involved in such
activities.7
This Note analyzes the likely effects of these laws on religious mi-
norities, particularly Christians, in Sri Lanka. Part I examines the his-
tory and current state of religion in the country. In doing so, it delves
into the dominance of Buddhism on the island and discusses the on-
going violent oppression of Christians there. Part II discusses the re-
ligious anti-conversion laws introduced by the Sri Lankan government
and explores their legislative history and content. Particularly close
attention is paid to the language of the laws, which contain frequent
references to religious liberty and human rights. Part III demonstrates
how the laws will undermine rather than promote religious liberty in
Sri Lanka. More speciªcally, it will discuss the ways in which the laws
will inhibit religious expression are explored.
I. Religion in Sri Lanka
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a small island
nation located approximately eighteen miles off the southeastern coast
of the Indian subcontinent.8 Despite a small population of approxi-
mately 19 million people, Sri Lanka is ethnically, linguistically and relig-
iously diverse.9 The Sinhalese, a predominantly Buddhist group, make
up 74% of the population.10 Tamils, most of whom are Hindu, com-
                                                                                                                     
6 See, e.g., Christian Solidarity, supra note 3; Press Release, Catholic Bishops’ Confer-
ence in Sri Lanka, Joint Statement of the Catholic Bishops and the National Christian Coun-
cil on the Proposed Legislation to Ban Conversions ( June 29, 2004), http://www.srilankan
christians.com/press2.html.
7 Private Member’s Bill, Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion, art. 2, art. 4
(proposed May 28, 2004) (Sri Lanka), available at http://www.lankaliberty.com/legisla-
tion/Private%20Member%27s%20Bill.pdf [hereinafter JHU Law]; Bill Drafted by Hon. Rat-
nasiri Wickramanayake, Minister of Buddhist Sasana, Act of 2004 for the Protection of Religious
Freedom, intro., art. 2, 5 (proposed June 16, 2004) (Sri Lanka), available at http://www.
lankaliberty.com/legislation/Govt%20Bill.pdf [hereinafter Cabinet Law].
8 Bureau of South Asian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Sri
Lanka (2004), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm [hereinafter State Dep’t].
9 See id.
10 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sri Lanka (2004), http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html [hereinafter CIA]; see also Library
of Congress, Country Studies, Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Russell R. Moss & An-
drea Matles Savada eds., 1988) (discussing the religious composition of the Sinhalese pop-
ulation of Sri Lanka).
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prise roughly 18% of the population.11 Christians and Muslims are the
third and fourth largest minority groups in Sri Lanka, making up 8%
and 7% of the population respectively.12
A. Buddhist Dominance
Buddhism has pervaded Sri Lankan society almost since its arrival
on the island in the third century B.C.13 Indeed, the Sinhalese people
who ªrst colonized the island rapidly embraced that religious tradi-
tion and developed a great civilization around it.14 From this civiliza-
tion arose an enduring ideology marked by two distinct elements: sin-
haladipa (the idea that the island of Sri Lanka belongs to the
Sinhalese) and dhammadipa (the notion that Sri Lanka is the “island
of Buddhism”).15 These themes ªnd frequent expression in the his-
torical chronicles written by Buddhist monks over the centuries and
have arguably inºuenced the actions of the Sinhalese-controlled gov-
ernment since its inception in 1948.16
Christianity, in both its Protestant and Roman Catholic forms,
arrived in Sri Lanka during the centuries of colonial rule by the Por-
tuguese, Dutch and British.17 This was not a peaceful arrival, however,
as the colonists, particularly the Portuguese, used their power to force
Christianity upon the indigenous population and to repress all forms
of Buddhism and Hinduism.18 The colonists did not succeed, how-
ever, in permanently converting most Sri Lankans, and Buddhism ex-
perienced a strong revival in the 1870s.19 Today, therefore, Christians
are a small minority in Sri Lanka, comprising only 8% of the total
population.20 Notably, however, unlike other religious groups in Sri
Lanka, the Christian community is not ethnically homogenous but
composed of both Sinhalese and Tamils.21
                                                                                                                     
11 CIA, supra note 10.
12 Id. The Muslim population in Sri Lanka is comprised of both Moor and Malay Mus-
lims. State Dep’t, supra note 8. Most Sri Lankan Christians are of the Roman Catholic
denomination. Id.
13 See State Dep’t, supra note 8.
14 See Moss & Savada, supra note 10.
15 Id.; see also S.I. Keethaponcalan, Social Cubism: A Comprehensive Look at the Causes of
Conºict in Sri Lanka, 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 921, 938 (2002).




20 CIA, supra note 10.
21 Keethaponcalan, supra note 15, at 937.
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B. Minority Oppression
Despite the small size and diverse ethnic composition of the Chris-
tian community in Sri Lanka, it has been met with extreme violence
and oppression over the last several years.22 Indeed, over the past two
years, members of the clergy have been beaten, churches have been
burned and female Christian missionaries have been sexually as-
saulted.23 In 2003, a total of ninety-one attacks on churches and Chris-
tians were reported.24 In the ªrst four months of 2004 alone, there were
forty-four assaults on churches in Sri Lanka.25 To put these numbers in
perspective, the attacks in Sri Lanka are occurring at a much higher
rate than the “much noted” wave of anti-Semitic violence in France.26
In addition to this violence, extremist Buddhist groups have launched
an anti-Christian propaganda campaign.27
The precise causes of this violence are unclear, especially because
Buddhists and Christians have had a peaceful coexistence up until re-
cently.28 Nevertheless, a number of issues may be cited as contributing
to the mistreatment of Christians in Sri Lanka, including the growth of
Christianity in rural areas,29 the perception of Christians as enemies
after decades of European colonialism,30 and the outrageous and wide-
spread public accusation that a Christian conspiracy led to the death of
a well-known Buddhist monk.31 Moreover, Christian Solidarity World-
wide, a non-proªt organization that works on behalf of persecuted
Christians, notes that there is suspicion among both Buddhists and
Hindus that the Roman Catholic Church has provided support to the
rebel group the Tamil Tigers.32 The accusation that has captured the
                                                                                                                     
22 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
23 Becket Fund, supra note 3. The churches targeted are both Catholic and Protestant
and located in both urban and rural areas. Winkler, supra note 1.
24 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
25 Winkler, supra note 1.
26 Id.
27 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
28 Page, supra note 2.
29 See id. “Although statistically there has been no growth in Christianity as a percent-
age of the population in the past 15 years, the Church, which had been declining, has
grown in some areas. This growth has mainly been with the newer, freer, evangelical and
Pentecostal churches.” Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
30 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
31 Page, supra note 2. Three autopsies of this monk, Gangodawila Soma, showed that
he died of natural causes. Id.
32 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3. A violent ethnic conºict has raged between the
Sinhalese and the Tamils since 1956. See State Dep’t, supra note 8. A tentative ceaseªre,
however, currently exists between the two groups and they have agreed to work with Norwe-
gian mediators to construct a permanent truce. Peace Deals in Sri Lanka, BBC News Online,
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attention of the Sri Lankan government the most, however, is the wide-
spread charge that Christians are engaged in “unethical conversions,”
an ambiguous term that has been used to describe everything from the
use of outright bribery to gain converts to the use of “more subtle
forms of humanitarian aid and development carried out as a normal
part of the Church’s mission.33
II. Discussion
A. The Rise of Religious Anti-Conversion Laws
On May 28, 2004, Sri Lanka’s JHU party introduced legislation
that would criminalize the conversion of others “by use of force or al-
lurement or by fraudulent means.”34 This legislation (“JHU law”) was
proposed largely in response to strong pressure from Buddhist monks
and anti-Christian Buddhist organizations for such an anti-conversion
law.35 Very similar to a law that was passed in Tamil Nadu, India in
2002,36 the JHU law has a number of effects on religious activities.37 It
would not only prevent forcible or “fraudulent” conversions but also
criminalize assistance in such conversions and requires all converts to
report their conversions to the government.38 Individuals found guilty
of such conversions would be subject to ªve years in prison and a ªne
not exceeding 150,000 rupees, which is approximately double the aver-
age annual salary in Sri Lanka.39 Interestingly, the punishments are in-
                                                                                                                     
Feb. 21, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1833000/
1833230.stm. Christian Solidarity asserts that allegations that Christians assisted the Tamils
during the violent conºict “are completely without foundation,” but notes that “it is true that
the church has spoken up for the ethnic minorities and has been more active in Tamil com-
munities.” Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
33 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
34 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2.
35 Page, supra note 2; Christian Solidarity, supra note 3. In January 2004, for exam-
ple, a group of Buddhist monks began a fast and demanded that the government enact
anti-conversion laws within 60 days. Page, supra note 2.
36 Anti-Conversion Bill Passed in T.N., The Hindu, Nov. 1, 2002, available at http://www.
hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/11/01/stories/2002110107030100.htm.
37 See JHU Law, supra note 7, arts. 2–6.
38 Id. arts. 2, 3(a).
39 Id. art. 4(a); Letter from Emilie L. Kao, Legal Counsel and Director and International
Advocacy, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, to Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga,
President of Sri Lanka and Mahinda Rajapakse, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka 4 ( July 23,
2004), available at http://www.lankaliberty.com/efforts/SLOpinionLetter.pdf. 150,000 ru-
pees is roughly equivalent to US $5,000. Id.
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creased when a woman, child, student, inmate, or law enforcement
ofªcer is converted.40
Shortly after the proposal of the JHU law, the President’s cabinet
introduced a similar bill entitled the “Act of 2004 for the Protection of
Religious Freedom.”41 This bill was proposed by the Minister of Buddha
Sasana, a member of the President’s cabinet, and goes further than the
JHU law by banning religious conversions altogether.42 Moreover, un-
like the JHU law, it provides for the extradition of any alien engaged in
conversion activities.43 The government seems to have been inºuenced
by the ªndings of the Buddhist Sasana Commission in 2002 and the
attacks on Christians and churches over the past two years in introduc-
ing this law.44
The JHU law met an obstacle in August 2004 when the Supreme
Court of Sri Lanka ruled that two of the law’s clauses were unconstitu-
tional.45 The two clauses at issue were Clause 3, which requires those
participating in conversions to report to the government, and Clause
4(b), which provides for the punishment of those failing to report.46
The Supreme Court said that these clauses violated Article 10 of Sri
Lankan Constitution, which provides for freedom of religion.47 The
Supreme Court also noted, however, that if Parliament passed the law
                                                                                                                     
40 JHU Law, supra note 7, art 4(a). The punishments for converting individuals within
those groups are a prison term no longer than seven years and a ªne not exceeding
500,000 rupees. Id.
41 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 1.
42 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3. The law states that “no person shall convert or
attempt to convert another person . . . .” Cabinet Law, supra note7, art. 2.
43 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 5(vi).
44 See Page, supra note 2; Christian Solidarity, supra note 3. The Commission on
Buddha Sasana met at the request of the Sri Lankan President and investigated Christian
activities, particularly those of Christian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Sri
Lanka. Christian Solidarity, supra note 3. According to Dr. Anula Wijesundera, a mem-
ber of the commission, it found that Christian groups have a “planned strategy . . . of
planting a church in every village” and “indoctrinating” small children by starting pre-
schools. Id.
45 Anti-Conversion Bill Inconsistent with the Constitution Says Supreme Court, ColomboPage,
Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.colombopage.com/archive/August17115907RA.html {hereinaf-
ter ColomboPage] (on ªle with author).
46 Id.; JHU Law, supra note 7, arts 3, 4(b).
47 ColomboPage, supra note 45; Const. of the Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka, ch. II, art. 9 [hereinafter Const.]. The Constitution stops short, however, of es-
tablishing Buddhism as the ofªcial state religion. Const., ch. II, art. 9.; Bureau of Democ-
racy, Human Rights, And Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Sri Lanka: International Relig-
ious Freedom Report 2004 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/
35520.htm.
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by a two-thirds majority, the law could come into effect.48 The court did
not comment on the provisions of the law that criminalize “fraudulent”
religious conversions.49 In response, the JHU announced that it would
make the necessary amendments to bring the law within the bounds of
the Sri Lankan Constitution and table the revised law within six
months.50 The Supreme Court has not examined the Cabinet law.
The current state of both laws remains unclear. The revised JHU
law has not yet been tabled and the Cabinet law “appears to have been
put on hold” for the time being, perhaps until the new JHU law is un-
veiled.51
B. Anti-Conversion Laws & Religious Liberty
The Constitution of Sri Lanka proclaims that Buddhism shall be
at the “foremost place” in the country and that “it shall be the duty of
the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana . . . .”52 The Consti-
tution also asserts, however, that all people are “entitled to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to
adopt the religion or belief of his choice.53 This language is virtually
identical to the language in the religious liberty provision of the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights54
and similar to the language used in the relevant provision of the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,55 both of
which Sri Lanka has signed.56 Indeed, given that the present Sri
Lankan Constitution was drafted in 1978, it is likely that its religious
liberty provisions were, in fact, based on these international cove-
nants.57 Thus, based on the language of its Constitution and its com-
mitment to these human rights covenants, it would appear that Sri
                                                                                                                     
48 ColomboPage, supra note 45.
49 See id.
50 Christian Solidarity, supra note 3.
51 See id.
52 Const., supra note 47, ch. II, art. 9.
53 Id. ch. III, art. 10.
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR
3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
56 See, e.g., Kao, supra note 39, at 2.
57 This appears even more likely in light of the fact that Sri Lanka is a signatory to both
documents. See, e.g., id. at 1.
130 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:123
Lanka is committed to protecting the rights of both its Buddhist ma-
jority and its religious minorities.58
The anti-conversion laws at issue, moreover, are presented as laws
designed to protect the religious liberty of Sri Lankans.59 The JHU law,
for instance, states in its preamble that the State “has a duty” to assure
to “all religions” the religious liberty rights granted in Articles 10 and
14(1)(e) of the Constitution.60 Similarly, the Cabinet law is entitled a
law “for the Protection of Religious Freedom” and states that it is intro-
duced “with a view to strengthening the mutual trust/unity that exists
among religions and with a view to protecting the religious freedom
that people have enjoyed in the past . . . .”61 Both laws, moreover, speak
primarily in terms of the prevention of conversions that are “illegal,”62
“compelled,”63 or “fraudulent,”64 conveying the idea that they are pro-
tecting religious persons from unfair or oppressive encroachments on
their religious liberty.65 In essence, the government of Sri Lanka has
employed a rhetoric of religious liberty rights when setting out the pro-
visions of these two laws.66
If put into force, however, these laws will have precisely the oppo-
site effect on the religious liberty rights of minorities within Sri Lanka,
particularly Christians,67 by severely inhibiting religious expression.68
Indeed, as proposed, the Cabinet law and the JHU law will do so in two
ways: suppressing religious speech and suppressing religious activity.69
                                                                                                                     
58 See Const., supra note 47, ch. III, art. 10; ICCPR, supra note 54, art. 18(1); UDHR,
supra note 55, art. 18.
59 See JHU Law, supra note 7, pmbl; Cabinet Law, supra note 7, intro.
60 See JHU Law, supra note 7, pmbl. Article 10 of the Sri Lankan Constitution provides:
“Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” Const., supra note 47, at
ch. III, art. 10. Article 14(1)(e) of the Constitution states that every citizen is entitled to
“the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.” Id.
ch. III, art. 14(1)(e).
61 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, intro., art. 1 (emphasis added).
62 Id., art. 2.
63 Id., art. 3.
64 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2.
65 Id.; Cabinet Law, supra note 7, intro., arts. 1, 2, 3.
66 See JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2.; Cabinet Law, supra note 7, intro, arts. 1, 2, 3.
67 Kao, supra note 39, at 2; Becket Fund, supra note 3; Christian Solidarity, supra
note 3; Press Release, supra note 6.
68 Becket Fund, supra note 3.
69 See generally Kao, supra note 39.
2006] Rights Rhetoric as an Instrument of Religious Oppression in Sri Lanka 131
III. Analysis
A. Suppression of Religious Speech
First, the laws suppress religious speech by deªning “fraudulent”
conversion in an overly broad manner.70 The bills criminalize any form
of religious speech that entails a misinterpretation of religious doctrine
or an outright untruthful one.71 The JHU bill, for instance, states that
“‘fraudulent’ means includes [sic] misinterpretation or other fraudulent
contrivance.”72 The Cabinet bill deªnes “fraudulent” as “the submission
of false information and the use of dishonest means.”73 Neither law,
however, provides a means of distinguishing between what is religiously
“true” or “false” nor between what is religiously correct interpretation
and what is not.74 These provisions of the law, therefore, “invite abuse”
of minority religious groups, whose speech—in the forms of teaching
or preaching—could be deemed “false” by Buddhist authorities who
wish to squelch them.75
In such an atmosphere, adherents of minority religious faiths in
Sri Lanka may rightly fear engaging in any form of religious speech,
regardless of whether it is aimed at converting others.76 Indeed,
though a religious adherent “may intentionally and explicitly prosely-
tize . . . in some instances, a religious adherent may manifest religious
belief in a manner that unintentionally or implicitly inºuences an-
other.”77 With Sri Lankan authorities having great leeway to deem
such religious expression “false,” and with the harsh penalties that
may incur as a result, such adherents may ªnd that the risks associated
with engaging in any form of religious expression far outweigh the
beneªts of engaging in it “either individually or in community with
others . . . .”78
B. Suppression of Religious Activity
Second, the laws severely inhibit religious activity by holding re-
ligious individuals liable for both intentional and unintentional con-
                                                                                                                     
70 See id. at 12.
71 See Cabinet Law, supra note 7, arts. 2, 8(d); JHU Law, supra note 7, arts. 2, 8(d).
72 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 8(d) (emphasis added).
73 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 8(d).
74 See Kao, supra note 39, at 7–8.
75 Id.
76 See Becket Fund, supra note 3.
77 See Kao, supra note 39, at 6; Becket Fund, supra note 3.
78 ICCPR, supra note 54, art. 18(1).
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versions.79 Indeed, the JHU law states that “no person shall convert or
attempt to convert, either directly or otherwise, any person from one
religion to another . . . .”80 Similarly, the Cabinet law deªnes “conver-
sion” as “any direct or indirect action or behaviour designed to cause a
person to abandon his practice of religion . . . .”81 As a result, virtually
any outward display of religious activity can be categorized as the type
of “conversion” activity that the laws criminalize.82
A letter to the Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga and Prime Min-
ister Rajapakse from the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty—an “inter-
national, interfaith, public interest law ªrm dedicated to protecting the
free expression of all religious traditions”—explains how the laws could
stymie all religious activities.83 It notes: “Even . . . common, everyday
practices that communicate religious meaning that other may ªnd at-
tractive—such as eating and drinking on Ramadan or Passover, or the
Catholic Mass—could . . . trigger liability under the Proposed Laws.”84
Further, “celebrations of major life events that communicate religious
beliefs—such as those surrounding births, marriages, and death—
could subject a religious assembly to liability.”85
Additionally, the laws undermine religious activity by criminalizing
the charitable giving engaged in by many religious adherents.86 The
laws do so by prohibiting the use of “allurement”87 by religious adher-
ents, which they broadly deªne as the bestowal of “any gift or
gratiªcation.”88 As virtually any form of charitable giving can be catego-
rized as the giving of gifts, religious adherents wishing to avoid ªnes or
jail time will have little choice but to cease such activities if the laws are
put into action.89 Many will have to do so, moreover, in spite of the fact
that such activities may be “central” to their religious practice.90 Mus-
                                                                                                                     
79 See Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 8(l)(a-b); JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2.
80 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2 (emphasis added).
81 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 8(l)(b) (emphasis added).
82 See Kao, supra note 39, at 5-6.
83 Id. at 1, 2.
84 Id. at 10–11.
85 Id. at 11.
86 Id. at 6.
87 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 2; see also Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 8(a).
88 JHU Law, supra note 7, art. 8(a)(i); see also Cabinet Law, supra note 7, art. 8(a).
89 See Kao, supra note 39, at 6-7.
90 “Almost by deªnition, only a limited number of religious practices can be funda-
mental to a person’s religion.” Steven C. Seeger, Restoring Rights to Rites: The Religious Moti-
vation Test and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1472, 1501 (1997).
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lims, for instance, will have to stop paying zakat (donations to the
poor), to avoid punishment for unintentionally “converting” others.91
Conclusion
Despite the attempts of the Sri Lankan government to couch the
language of the proposed religious anti-conversion laws in the rhetoric
of religious liberty, it is clear that the laws, as proposed, are instruments
of religious oppression. If passed, the laws will severely restrain the abil-
ity of religious adherents to engage in religious expression and other
forms of religious activities, as doing so will subject them to outrageous
ªnes and even jail time. Thus, instead of “strengthening the mutual
trust/unity that exists among religions”92 in Sri Lanka or “promoting
religious harmony”93 on the island, it is more likely that the laws will
contribute to the ongoing mistreatment of religious minorities.
If the government of Sri Lanka is truly concerned about protect-
ing the religious liberty of all citizens, it should engage in a much closer
examination of both the “unethical” conversions that are allegedly oc-
curring in the nation and at the language of the proposed laws. In do-
ing so, the Sri Lankan government is likely to ªnd that the former are
signiªcantly less threatening to the rights of Sri Lankans than the latter.
                                                                                                                     
91 See Kao, supra note 39, at 6–7.
92 Cabinet Law, supra note 7, intro.
93 JHU Law, supra note 7, pmbl.
